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6Restructuring of Corporate Debts after
the Asian Currency Crisis: Implications
of Agency-Cost Analysis
I. Introduction
In the present chapter, corporate debt restructuring will be examined by using
agency-cost analysis.1 The uniqueness of such an analysis is that as the start-
ing point, the unintended, unexpected changes that occurred in capital struc-
ture as a result of the Asian currency crisis were observed and it was postu-
lated that the accompanying increase of agency cost was shouldered by creditors
and shareholders, whereas in the conventional argument, it is generally as-
sumed that the borrower usually shoulders the agency cost. In addition, the
concepts developed here were also represented by geometric diagrams to give
the readers the opportunity to visualize them and facilitate the understanding
of the different conclusions stemming from changing conditions. In the first
half of the chapter, the model will be introduced, followed by its implications
in the last half, but first an outline of the agency-cost approach will be pre-
sented.
In the Modigliani-Miller Theorem (hereafter MM Theorem),2 which can be
taken as the starting point for addressing this problem, capital structure and
corporate decision-making about investment, production, etc. are not consid-
ered to mutually influence one another, but rather to be independent aspects of
enterprises. Therefore, capital structure is not considered to be a major prob-
lem. However, the MM Theorem can only be applied to an ideal economy free
of the various kinds of “frictions,” while in a real economy, capital structure
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and corporate decision-making do not exist independently of one another.
In the real world, any enterprise’s managers (or controlling shareholders),
general stockholders, and creditors have different interests, which tend to
conflict; and due to information asymmetry, the enterprise’s management
does not always act as the loyal agent of the general stockholders and credi-
tors who have provided it with capital. This is because changes in capital
structure may alter the decision-making process in an enterprise and exert an
influence on the enterprise behavior, enterprise value, and the like.
For example, general stockholders are interested in maximizing enterprise
value, while managers (or controlling shareholders) could very well decide
not to maximize that value but be rather motivated by personal interest. There
is always the danger of “empire building” on the part of managers for their
own satisfaction, resulting in such aspects unrelated to enterprise profitability
as construction of luxurious office buildings and leisure facilities as well as
acquisition of huge expense accounts. Whenever information shared by gen-
eral stockholders and managers is asymmetric (which occurs more often than
not), either it becomes easier for such a non-maximizing behavior to occur, or
additional funds will have to be expended on monitoring managers to prevent
such behavior. Here lies the cause of agency costs of external financing through
stock issuance.
Agency costs (hereafter AC) can also be encountered in the issuance of
debentures and borrowing from banks. We can equate these two forms of fund
raising in the present analysis since the objective of both contracts is to pay
fixed amounts of cash in the future in return for present cash. Generally
speaking, when borrowers cannot repay, creditors are limited in terms of the
amounts they will be able to recover, since debt contracts are based on the
principle of limited liability. Creditors can take steps to seize the assets of
such borrowers, but cannot seize the private property of enterprise managers,
nor request that stockholders pay the difference.
Due to such a feature, what is important from the standpoint of creditors is
not necessarily the maximization of enterprise value, but rather that the value
does not drop below the amount required to pay back the contracted principle
and interest. The rise of opposing incentives with managers and stockholders
can also occur.3 From the latter’s standpoint, high-risk, high-return ventures
are desirable, and in extreme cases, it is possible to select a high-risk venture
over a safer one with less expected return. This is because in ventures financed
by loans, all the extra income over and above the debt payment belongs to
managers and stockholders if successful, whereas creditors will bear the bur-
den for failure. Therefore, when there is information asymmetry between
managers and creditors, the issuance of debt also incurs AC.
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Now since fund-raising through stock issuance and debt issuance both
incur AC, the wisest choice is to use a combination of the two so as to
minimize the total amount of AC. The optimum combination of stock and debt
for such a purpose will result in an optimum capital structure; and here it is
important to distinguish between additional and total AC. Hereafter, we will
refer to additional AC resulting from a unit change in the amounts of debt and
stock as “marginal AC,” while total AC will be referred to simply as “AC.”
To repeat, there are two sources of AC: those incurred due to the behavior
on the part of agents that is harmful to the interests of their principals, and
those incurred for the purpose of preventing such behavior. The latter can be
further divided into bonding and monitoring costs, to determine who incurs
the AC, the former being directly incurred by the agent (enterprise), the latter
by the principals (stockholders and creditors).4 However, according to the
conventional argument, in either case, it is always the enterprise that ends up
bearing the cost, because even in the case of monitoring, stock and debt
instruments will be issued at prices reduced by the amount of AC; therefore,
stockholders and creditors are able to shift the cost burden onto enterprises. A
unique feature of the analysis that follows is a departure from the conventional
argument in this respect. Since the worsening of corporate finance brought
about by the Asian currency crisis was an unexpected change, it will be
postulated here that the resultant increases in AC were borne by the providers
of capital.
Unless it is possible to raise interests rates after the fact, creditors cannot
transfer the burden of increasing debt-related AC to debtors. However, in
almost all cases, it is difficult to change contract stipulations after the fact. By
the same token, stockholders cannot transfer the unexpected increase of AC
after the fact. Therefore, in the examination of the crisis presented here,
increased AC after the fact will be assumed to have been borne by stockhold-
ers and creditors.
Also, the costs of bankruptcy will be included in debt-related AC.5 Here,
since the incidence of bankruptcy stems from the issuance of debt, additional
costs will accompany the costs involved in debt issuance itself. However,
bankruptcy does not always occur. Therefore, more accurately, the cost of
bankruptcy is the probability that bankruptcy occurs as a result of debt issu-
ance multiplied by the costs expected in the case of failure. What should be
noted here, however, is the fact that bankruptcy in itself is not a cost, for even
when it occurs, additional costs can be eliminated by smooth and efficient
bankruptcy procedures. Actually, though, such cost-free procedures are sel-
dom carried out.
For example, due to information asymmetry and negotiation costs among
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the interested parties, costs may rise from inappropriate bankruptcy proce-
dures. Appropriate procedures involve a comparison between the value of an
enterprise as a going concern and the value of liquidation, action being taken
on the basis of which predominate. Otherwise, more economic value than is
actually necessary will be lost. For the same reason, unnecessary delays in
bankruptcy procedures can also result in the loss of economic value. The more
time it takes to carry out bankruptcy, the more financial distress will occur,
like talented human resources and excellent customers being taken by rival
enterprises, resulting in unnecessary losses in the value of a going concern
and that of liquidation.
What follows is an explanation of the methodology to be used via both a
basic model and diagrams in Section II, followed by an analysis of the Asian
currency crisis in Section III. Finally, in Section IV, the results of the model
analysis will be summed up and implications will be pointed out.
II. Model and Diagrammatic Methodology
First, let us define our variables and symbols:
V: Total enterprise value,
B: Total value of debt,
ST: The total market value of stock,
SI: A part of ST held by enterprise managers and controlling shareholders,
and
S: The share of ST held by general stockholders.
The relationship among the variables can be expressed by the following equa-
tions.
V = ST + B, (6.1)
ST = SI + S. (6.2)
Next AC can be expressed generally by the following functions with many
variables.
Debt-related AC: ACB (B, S, SI, V, . . . ),
Stock-related AC: ACS (S, B, SI, V, . . . ).
However, here they will be simplified to the single variable functions,
ACB (B): AC for cost accompanying debt issuance and
ACS (S): AC for cost accompanying stock issuance.
They will be expanded to two variables in the following section.
Marginal AC will be expressed as functions MACB (B) for debt and MACS (S)
for stock and MACB (B) = ∂ACB (B) / ∂B, MACS (S) = ∂ACS (S) / ∂S.
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1. Debt-Related AC Diagram
Figure 6-1 is composed of a horizontal axis representing the amount of debt
and a vertical axis representing the debt-related marginal AC. Here we assume
that marginal AC is increasing linearly along a fixed slope.6 Linearity is
assumed only for the purpose of simplicity in drawing the diagram. From an
analytical point of view, we only need a marginal AC function for an increas-
ing function of B. That is,
∂MACB (B) > 0. (6.3)∂B
When total debt is at B′, AC is denoted by the shaded triangular area in the
diagram, which can be expressed as
ACB (B′) = ∫B′0 MACB (B)dB. (6.4)
2. Stock-Related AC Diagram
In the same manner, stock-related AC can be expressed like in Figure 6-2.
Only the coordinates have been reversed, in order to match them with debt-
related AC in one diagram presented later.
The horizontal axis corresponds to the total stock held by general stock-
holders and the vertical axis to the stock-related marginal AC. The same
assumptions can be applied as in the case of debt-related AC, giving the
expression
∂MACS (S) > 0. (6.5)∂S
Again stock-related AC at S′ is denoted by the shaded triangle, expressed as
Fig. 6-1. Debt-Related AC
MACB (B)
ACB (B′)
B′
B
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ACS(S′) = ∫S′0 MACS (S)dS. (6.6)
3. Diagram Combining Debt- and Stock-Related AC
Figure 6-3 is a combination of Figures 6-1 and 6-2. The distance OBOS
along the horizontal axis expresses the total amount of external fund-raising,
the distance between a point on the horizontal axis and OB, the amount of debt
financing and the distance between a point on the horizontal axis and OS, the
amount of stock financing. We use the notation OF to express total external
financing, that is,
OF = B + S. (6.7)
In the diagram, at the given amounts of B = B′, S = S′, total AC is indicated
by the total area of the two shaded triangles. Therefore, when the amount of
financing is fixed, the process of searching for the combination of B and S that
will result in minimum total AC is the same as that of minimizing the com-
bined area of the two shaded triangles, which occurs when their heights along
the vertical axis are equal.
Here is a constrained minimization problem that will lead to the same
conclusion:
mi
B, S
n (ACB (B) + ACS (S)), (6.8)
s.t. B + S = OF.
By substituting the constraint and searching for necessary and sufficient con-
ditions, the first order (necessary) condition is,
Fig. 6-2. Stock-Related AC
MACS (S)
S
ACS(S′)
S′
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= MACB (B) − MACS (OF − B)
= MACB (B) − MACS (S)
= 0; (6.9)
and the second order (sufficient) condition is
= +
> 0. (6.10)
From the first-order condition, we understand that the minimization of
total AC is obtained at the point where debt-related marginal AC is equal to
stock-related marginal AC. From assumptions (6.3) and (6.5), the second
order condition is satisfied. However, both assumptions are too strict. For
example, even if either one of the marginal ACs may not increase, but remains
fixed, the second-order condition would be satisfied. (Example: even if
 > 0, = 0, the condition is satisfied.)
d(ACB (B) + ACS (OF − B))
dB
d2(ACB (B) + ACS (OF − B))
dB2
dMACS (S)
dS
dMACB (B)
dB
dMACB (B)
dB
dMACS (S)
dS
MACB (B)
MACS (S)Total external
financing (OF)
ACB
ACS
OS
OB B′
S′
BS
Fig. 6-3. Combination of Fig. 6-1 and Fig. 6-2
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Although the above amount of OF is given, generally it is also an endog-
enous variable determined by one condition or another. (Please refer to Ap-
pendix 6-1 to this chapter explaining how the amount of external capital to be
procured, i.e., optimum enterprise scale, is determined.)
III. Analysis of the Asian Currency Crisis
A. Characteristics of the Changes Accompanying the Crisis
To begin with, as the first step in analyzing the Asian currency crisis in
terms of our AC framework, it is necessary to determine what changes were
brought about by the crisis, resulting in a discussion different from the stan-
dard discourse.
Plummeting foreign exchange rates during the crisis were accompanied by
swelling amounts of existing foreign-currency-denominated debt expressed
in domestic currency. The point is that debt ratios expanded unexpectedly and
that changes in the capital structure occurred after capital was procured.
Here let us formulate a set of assumptions or preconditions for our analysis,
beginning with the assumption that the enterprise value did not change. That
is,
dV = 0. (6.12)
From the fact that the crisis slowed the economies of Asia down, reductions in
the enterprise value may have actually occurred. However, here we want to
consider only the effect that declining foreign exchange rates exerted on
corporate balance sheets. It is a fairly conservative assumption, since it can be
expected that the resulting main conclusions will be strengthened, when the
enterprise value decreases.
Next, the value of debt increased, but we will assume that the extent of the
increase did not go beyond the total market value of stock prior to the crisis.
That is,
dB > 0, (6.13)
ST > dB. (6.14)
Assumption (6.13) should be obvious enough, but Assumption (6.14) de-
serves some additional explanation. According to assumption (6.14), after the
crisis, enterprises involved did not experience capital deficits. Since if capital
deficits did occur, other problems beside AC would arise,7 We will limit the
investigation to enterprises whose debt ratio sharply rose, but who did not
experience capital deficits.
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Based on the above assumptions, we know that
dST + dB = 0. (6.15)
(Totally differentiating equation (6.1) for V and substituting dV = 0.)
Since we assume dB > 0,
dST < 0. (6.16)
and equation (6.2) corresponds to dST = dSI + dS (total differential), it follows
that
dSI + dS < 0. (6.17)
On the other hand, since when the value of the stock drops, that of both
general and controlling shareholders is influenced equally in proportion, it
follows that
dS
=
dSI
. (6.18)S SI
Combined with (6.17), we know that
dSI < 0 and (6.19)
dS < 0. (6.20)
Now let us expand the functions of AC and marginal AC to two variables.
As indicated previously, the most general assumptions are
ACB (B, S, SI, V, . . . ),
ACS (S, B, SI, V, . . . ),
allowing us to consider functions with many variables. However, first we will
ignore the enterprise value item, because in the analysis here we have as-
sumed that V did not change (assumption [6.12]). In order to simplify further,
we will assume that ACB is not influenced by S, nor is ACS influenced by B
(i.e., we ignore any cross effects). As a result, we can consider that ACB is a
function of B, SI and that ACS is a function of S, SI.
Furthermore, we assume the functional forms,
ACB ( ),
ACS ( )
and assume that ACB and ACS are increasing functions. This simplification was
made in order to obtain results with analytical significance. (The appropriate-
ness of such simplification will be discussed at the end of this chapter.)
B
SI
S
SI
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Also, the functional forms of marginal AC are
MACB ( ),
MACS ( )
and are assumed to be increasing functions.
B. Analysis of the Influence of AC on the Currency Crisis
What we want to determine here is what changes occurred in debt- and
stock-related AC and marginal AC. Let us begin with the stock-related analy-
sis.
Change in ACS
It is clear that dACS = 0, since
d ( ) = ( − )
= 0.
(The expression in parenthesis on the right is zero from assumption (6.18).)
Change in MACS
Although dACS = 0 as shown above, dMACS = 0 is not true. Because
MACS = ∂ACS /∂S,
MACS = ⋅ .
When we totally differentiate both sides of this equation, we obtain
dMACS = ⋅ − [ ⋅ + ⋅ ]dSI
=
⋅ ⋅ ( − ) − ⋅
= −
⋅
= −MACS ⋅
> 0.
(We have used equation (6.18) for transforming the second line to the third.)
B
SI
S
SI
S
SI
S
SI
dS
S
dSI
SI
∂ACS
∂ (S / SI)
1
SI
dSI
SI2
∂ACS
∂ (S / SI)
dSI
SI2
dS
SI2
∂ 2ACS
∂ (S / SI)2
dS
S
dSI
SI
∂ACS
∂ (S / SI)
dSI
SI2
S
SI3
∂ 2ACS
∂ (S / SI)2
dS
SI2
∂ 2ACS
∂ (S / SI)2
∂ACS
∂ (S / SI)
1
SI2
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At first glance, although it may appear strange that stock-related marginal
AC is increasing while AC remains unchanged, the following explanation
may be given. First, the value of the stock decreased due to the currency crisis,
but since the relative size (proportion) of the shares held by general and
controlling shareholders did not change, the relationship between them re-
mained the same. Therefore, total AC will not change. On the other hand,
despite the absence of change in their share of stock, controlling shareholders
will experience a reduction in the absolute value of that share, SI, which
causes a problem encountered at the time of new stock issuance to the public.
Suppose that the company raises a certain amount of money by public issu-
ance of new stocks, this will dilute the share of SI much more when the
absolute value of SI is smaller, implying an increase in the additional (mar-
ginal) AC at the time of new stock issuance.
Change in ACB
dACB = ⋅dB + ⋅dSI
> 0.
Looking at the right side, ∂ACB /∂B is MACB and is positive; dB is positive
given inequality (6.13); ∂ACB /∂SI is negative, since ACB is an increasing
function of (B/SI); and dSI is negative, given inequality (6.19). Therefore, the
first item on the right side corresponds to the multiplication of two positive
values and the second item to the multiplication of two negative values;
therefore both are positive and will produce a positive sum.
Change in MACB
MACB = ⋅ ,
and when totally differentiating both sides, we obtain
dMACB = ⋅ − [ ⋅ + ⋅ ]dSI
=
⋅ ⋅ ( − ) − ⋅
=
⋅ ⋅ ( ⋅ ) − ⋅
= −
⋅ ⋅
− MACB ⋅
∂ACB
∂B
∂ACB
∂SI
∂ACB
∂ (B / SI)
1
SI
B
SI3
∂ 2ACB
∂ (B / SI)2
dB
SI2
∂ 2ACB
∂ (B / SI)2
∂ACB
∂ (B / SI)
1
SI2
B
SI2
∂ 2ACB
∂ (B / SI)2
dB
B
dSI
SI
∂ACB
∂ (B / SI)
dSI
SI2
B
SI2
∂ 2ACB
∂ (B / SI)2
−V
B
dSI
SI
∂ACB
∂ (B / SI)
dSI
SI2
∂ 2ACB
∂ (B / SI)2
V
SI2
dSI
SI
dSI
SI
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= −
⋅
V
⋅
− MACB ⋅
= −( ⋅V + MACB) ⋅
> 0.
(Note that in the transformation from the second to third lines, we have used
the equations 6.12–6.18 for dB, dS, and dSI.)
Comparison of the Values of dMACS and dMACB
Here it will be shown that the value of dMACB is higher than that of dMACS,
indicating that after the changes of the two marginal ACs brought about by the
currency crises, debt-related marginal AC should increase.
dMACB − dMACS = −( ⋅V + MACB) ⋅ − (−MACS ⋅ )
= −( ⋅ V + MACB − MACS) ⋅
= −
⋅
V
⋅
> 0.
(Note that in the transformation from line two to three, we have used the fact
that MACB = MACS was the initial situation just before the crisis.)
C. Results in Diagrammatic Form
First, let us look at Figure 6-4. It is not yet an accurate illustration of the
results, but it merely corresponds to Figure 6-3 in the previous section with
some additional comments. The changes brought about by the crisis led first
to an increase in the amount of debt (dB > 0), which promoted a decrease in
stock prices.
The reason why the diagram is not accurate is because the changes that
occurred in total and marginal AC were not reflected. (They are reflected in
Figure 6-5, however.) First, debt- and stock-related marginal AC both in-
creased for any given argument, i.e., their curves shifted. Secondly, debt-
related total AC increased, while stock-related AC remained unchanged. (Note
that the lack of change of stock-related AC is not sufficiently illustrated in the
diagram.) Finally, the relationship between the two marginal AC figures after
the changes showed that the debt-related marginal AC was higher
(MACBnew > MACSnew in the diagram). This last result indicates that after the
∂MACB
∂B
dSI
SI
dSI
SI
∂MACB
∂B
dSI
SI
dSI
SI
∂MACB
∂B
∂MACB
∂B
dSI
SI
∂MACB
∂B
dSI
SI
dSI
SI
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changes, since the capital structure was not at the optimum level, in order to
restore that optimum, it would be necessary to increase the share of stock
financing and reduce debt-financing. Several measures could be taken to help
restore the optimum balance, and these will be outlined in the following
section.
IV. Summary of Results and Implications
A. Summary
The rise in the value of debt denominated in foreign currency caused by a
currency crisis (1) decreased the value of stock, (2) increased the total AC of
existing debt, while stock-related AC remained unchanged (under a given
assumption), (3) increased both debt- and stock-related marginal AC (i.e.,
increased the costs incurred by new capital procurement), and (4) the rise in
Fig. 6-4. Crisis Inflates the Share of Debt in
the Corporate Financial Structure
MACB (B)
MACS (S)
ACB
ACS
S B
Decrease in the stock
market value
Total external financing
Increase in
amount of debt
107RESTRUCTURING OF CORPORATE DEBTS
debt-related marginal AC should be higher than the rise in stock-related mar-
ginal AC.
Result (1) is in accordance with intuition and actual development after the
Asian currency crisis. Result (2) means that the management of existing debt
became costly. For example, creditors had to pay a great deal of attention to
monitor borrowers whose incentives decreased and who became much more
inclined to act against creditor’s interest.
On the other hand, the conclusion that stock-related AC should not change
in result (2) may seem puzzling, but it is caused by the fact that the proportion
of stock held by controlling shareholders and corporate managers should not
change compared to that held by general stockholders, though its value de-
creased. That is to say, the balance of power between the two groups remained
unchanged. It is for this reason that total AC did not change. However, result
(3) implies that if attempts were made to procure new capital through public
offering of new shares, investors would not respond unless stock prices de-
creased.
Fig. 6-5. Decrease in SI Causing Outward Shifts in MAC Curves
MACB (B)
MACS (S)
MACSnew
MACBnew
BS
108 CHAPTER 6
Result (4) means that although the cost of both stock and debt finance
increased, stock issuance was the better alternative, if necessary. That is to
say, even when enterprises resumed capital procurement after a crisis, at the
time when the economy was beginning to recover, they may prefer to issue
stock than borrow funds. And if so, any recovery in bank lending is likely to
lag behind that of the whole economy, as it actually happened in many coun-
tries affected by the Asian currency crisis.8
B. Who Bore the Burden of AC and Enthusiasm for Reform
What are the implications of many enterprises that prefer to procure new
funds by means different from those incurring debt? For example, enterprises
may probably not be very enthusiastic about institutional reform that would
help reduce debt-related AC (both total and marginal), because they have no
plans to do so in the near future. However, from the standpoint of creditors,
such reform is extremely important, because unexpected rises in AC after the
fact will, unlike new debt issuance, be borne by creditors instead of the
debtors (enterprises). It is only natural that those who have to bear such costs
should become enthusiastic about reforms that will help reduce their burdens.
Let us take, for example, the reform of accounting standards. Since enter-
prises compile and publicly disclose financial statements as one method of
bonding, improvements in accounting standards may result in a higher reli-
ability and probably lead to a reduction in debt-related AC. However, for
enterprises that are not considering incurring new debts in the near future,
such an issue will lack any urgency. On the other hand, from the standpoint of
creditors, accounting reform would support their monitoring activities and
neutralize any increases in AC, except for enterprises that are not appreciably
affected by a currency crisis. The potential of such enterprises to procure
capital via debt remains the same as that before the crisis, and they would
undoubtedly be enthusiastic about any reform that would reduce debt-related
AC.
A prevalent opinion about the relationship between economic crises and
economic reform implies that economic recovery always cools the enthusi-
asm for structural reform necessitated by a crisis. However, based on the
situation considered above, there was no such tradeoff between recovery and
reform. This is because upon recovery, the larger the number of enterprises
who need to raise capital via debt, the greater the enthusiasm for reform that
would reduce debt-related AC.
In addition, while this is not directly related to reform, we can probably cite
the occurrence of “strategic default”9 in post-crisis Thailand as an interesting
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example of how rises in AC after the fact affected corporate behavior. The
phenomenon of defaulting, despite the ability to repay both the principal and
interest, defies the normal situation in which enterprises that consider procur-
ing capital via debt would not in their right minds dare damage their relations
with creditors in such a way. In other words, those who default strategically
must be indifferent to debt-financing, at least for the time being. This fact is in
agreement with our model’s conclusion according to which debt-related mar-
ginal AC increases more rapidly than stock-related marginal AC, which dis-
courages new debt financing by firms. Obviously, it should also be pointed out
that Thailand’s legal system at the time (with a weak mechanism for enforcing
contract performance) made such behavior possible.
Regarding institutional frameworks such as good accounting standards and
efficient bankruptcy laws, the countries affected by the Asian currency crisis
have been blamed for not implementing these measures after the crisis, al-
though such a problem was scarcely referred to before the crisis. Their laxity
in this area became a major issue only after the crisis struck, and the viewpoint
of AC can be very helpful in explaining such a discontinuity. To begin with,
even if a government decided to adopt such an institutional framework, it
would be costly in terms of both political decision-making and administration
of the system. If so, it would be possible under precrisis conditions that the
marginal cost of setting up such a system might have outweighed its marginal
benefits. Therefore, although everyone pointed to institutional deficiencies
after the crisis, not taking steps to invest time and money for setting up such a
system before the crisis could have been a rational decision.
Bureaucrats and civil servants in some countries cannot be considered to be
highly talented in the jobs they do. Due to such a human resource problem, the
design of new institutions and their implementation may be more costly than
otherwise. In addition to such high administrative costs, in some environ-
ments, due to a rent-seeking behavior, objective and rational decision-making
may be very difficult, resulting in the increase of the decision-making costs of
system building.
On the other hand, we cannot conclude that, since governments were negli-
gent in the past about setting up such institutions, they will remain so in the
future. If governments realize that rising AC caused by the crisis is now
sufficiently high and understand what that means, there is a high probability
that efforts will be made to correct the situation institutionally, despite the
political and administrative costs involved. As an example, countries like
Indonesia and Thailand, which had failed to set up bankruptcy laws, took the
opportunity of the crisis to make provisions for that aspect in their legal
systems.
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C. Policy Evaluation
Agency-cost analysis can also be effective in a more practical way in
creating effective policy. With AC analysis it becomes possible to consider the
advantages and drawbacks of a policy. (For proof of the following statements,
see Appendix 6-2 to this chapter.)
To begin with, let us look at the promotion of debt-equity conversion
(DEC), which is a very effective policy for changing capital structure directly.
Debt-equity conversion has also been considered to be a beneficial trump card
for maintaining a healthy capital structure, and some countries rely on this
measure as their main corporate restructuring policy. However, as shown in
Appendix 6-2, the effects of DEC are limited. Although DEC changes the
relative shares of debt and stock in external finances, it does not change the
shape of marginal AC curves. On the other hand, rescheduling and debt
forgiveness are superior to DEC in lowering marginal AC curves across the
board. However, since these measures involved transfer of income between
interested parties, they are seldom implemented spontaneously.
Compared to them, policies geared to directly reducing debt- and stock-
related ACs are more effective. They include setting up a legal structure to
decrease the cost of bankruptcy and strengthening accounting standards to
decrease bonding costs. If through such policies marginal ACs can be
sufficiently reduced, the effects will spread throughout the economy and ACs
related to both existing and new capital procurement will decrease.
Now let us look examine which is more effective, a policy for reducing
mainly debt-related AC or that geared to lowering stock-related AC. The
answer is that both are associated with advantages and disadvantages. Imme-
diate results can be obtained by measures geared to reducing stock-related
AC. As seen previously, after a crisis, many enterprises strongly tend to delay
debt instrument issuance, and prefer issuing stock when procuring capital.
Under such circumstances, it will not be possible to make new capital pro-
curement via debt unless marginal AC decreases significantly. Therefore,
reducing stock-related AC will result in the immediate increase of new corpo-
rate investment.
On the other, stock issuance is not usually an alternative available to small
and medium-scale businesses. From their standpoint, reducing stock-related
AC is meaningless and reducing debt-related AC is an important part of
keeping that sector of the economy afloat.
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D. Significance of Bankruptcy Laws and Some Points of Caution
Among the policies discussed so far, setting up a legal structure deserves
special mention. Its evaluation centers around the question of whether or not
such a mechanism can actually decrease bankruptcy costs and AC. First and
foremost, can such a policy guarantee expeditious bankruptcy proceedings,
for speed is the key to preventing financial distress and thus the reduction of
an enterprise’s value as a going concern or liquidation value. Secondly, such
policy must help avoid either inefficient liquidation or inefficient continuation
of operations, which is another key to reducing debt-related AC. A solution to
both problems is offered by the Aghion-Hart-Moore (hereafter AHM) pro-
posal (Aghion, Hart, and Moore 1992), which suggests that it is possible to
avoid both inefficient liquidations and continuations through a clever combi-
nation of DEC and granting of stock options on a priority basis. However, the
implementation of such a policy requires innovative and complex procedures.
In contrast, Ikeo and Seshimo (1999) argue that the practice of private-sector
bankruptcy resolution based on the main-bank system in Japan would result in
exactly the same effects as the AHM proposal. Here we have a very interesting
case, in that this practice can be adopted both actually and on a private basis.
(However, the same study showed that in recent years the rationale for the
main banking system has disappeared in Japan, and that it is gradually losing
its effectiveness as a means for bankruptcy proceedings.) In several countries
of East Asia, bankruptcy legal reform has been implemented along the lines of
the legislation in the United States. However, according to recent studies,10
among Japanese, U.S., and European practices, the American model is the
most lenient toward enterprise managers in debt. Ikeo and Seshimo (1999)
also pointed out that the American system gives too much discretion to the
judiciary and described the damage caused. This is because setting up a legal
system determines how private negotiations are carried out, in that the exist-
ence of a bankruptcy law becomes the starting point for private negotiations.
For example, in Japan, judiciary discretion is considerably limited. For this
reason, allocations expected in judicial decisions are easily agreed upon and
negotiations with such allocations as the starting point are comparatively
easily concluded. In contrast, in the United States, the result of litigation
depends heavily on the discretion of the court, thus posing barriers to negotia-
tion at the private level.
Several decisions have already been handed down under the new bank-
ruptcy laws in Thailand and Indonesia, resulting in such strong criticism as (1)
most of them favored the debtor, and (2) due to the broad judicial discretion,
not much can be expected. In many cases, the governments of these countries
112 CHAPTER 6
have been called to task, but it was somehow a consequence stemming from
their American-style model. Therefore, attention should be paid to alternative
models existing in Europe and Japan, and revisions be made to correct the
situation.11
E. Fire Sale
Agency-cost analysis also has implications when dealing with foreign stock-
holders and creditors, because these parties have access to less information
than their domestic counterparts. Such information asymmetry is the source
of conflicts of interest between concerned parties in enterprises and can also
exacerbate existing conflicts. Furthermore, the cost of monitoring by foreign
investors is relatively higher than that of domestic counterparts, thus increas-
ing AC.
As previously mentioned, on the occasion of new capital procurement,
when marginal AC is higher, investors will request cheaper stock and creditors
higher interest rates. Therefore, when the number of potential investors de-
creases in the domestic economy due to a currency crisis, only foreigners
requiring high ACs will be left, possibly leading to a sharper decrease in stock
prices than normally necessary. Following a currency crisis, foreign enter-
prises become interested in acquiring domestic enterprises in the name of “fire
sales.” Such a practice of foreign acquisition for less than the real enterprise
value has been criticized in the past, but in my opinion, the foreigners in-
volved are only acting in good faith, and they are merely looking for good
deals, based on their own subjective ideas of AC expense. On the other, since
such valuation is lower than that of domestic agents (i.e., the estimation of the
enterprise value is higher by the latter), it is considered to be unreasonable. In
any case, these differences in consciousness tend to make negotiations difficult
and cause political problems like xenophobic public opinion.
F. Examining the Model’s Assumption
Finally, we would like to draw the attention to some of the strong assump-
tions that were inserted into our model in order to produce results. Among
them, probably the most important is the argument concerning the AC and
marginal AC functions; namely, B / SI for debt-related and S / SI for stock-
related AC (and marginal AC). In other words, it is assumed that B and S do
not overlap and mutually influence the two ACs and that SI is not an absolute
amount, but merely one relative to B or S. If these restrictions are lifted, any
accurate analysis becomes difficult. Therefore, simulation or some other meth-
ods should be employed.
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Although the assumptions were somehow simplified as stated above, the
model predictions obtained were largely consistent with the actual develop-
ment after the crisis. For example, our model predicted that the increase in
stock-related marginal AC would be relatively small compared to that of debt-
related marginal AC after the crisis, which implies that external fund-raising
may become expensive but, relatively speaking, fund-raising through stock
could be cheaper than through borrowing. Actually, in the case of East Asia,
while bank lending after the crisis continued to stagnate, new capital procure-
ment on its stock markets recovered in a relatively short time.
Appendix 6-1. Deciding on the Amount of External Financing
Here we will explain the minimization problem (8) using the Lagrangian
multiplier method. Since Lagrangian L can be written as
L = ACB (B) + ACS (S) + λ(OF − B − S).
The first-order condition is
∂L / ∂B = MACB (B) − λ = 0,
∂L / ∂S = MACS (S) − λ = 0,
∂L / ∂λ = OF − B − S = 0.
The Langrangian multiplier λ corresponds to a shadow price when restric-
tions are loosened. It is
λ = MACB (B) = MACS (S).
On the other hand, by differentiating the first-order condition and arranging
dλ and dOF, we obtain
Based on the assumptions outlined in this chapter, we know that the value is
positive. If we plot OF on the horizontal axis and λ on the vertical axis, the
resulting curve will slope upwards to the right. Because λ is the shadow price
of external financing, it can be considered to represent the marginal cost curve
for changes in the amount of procured capital.
= .
dλ
dOF dMACB (B)
dB
dMACS (S)
dS+
dMACB (B)
dB
dMACS (S)
dS⋅
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We added capital SI contributed by controlling shareholders (but making it
a given exogenous variable) and assumed a safe interest rate, r, as the opportu-
nity cost attributed to this portion of capital, because we postulated that this
portion corresponds to internal funds free of AC. After fully utilizing internal
funds, external fund-raising occurred accompanied by AC as well as the
opportunity cost of capital, r. Therefore we obtained a kinked cost curve for
funds, λ + r shown in Appendix Figure 6-1. Then we drew a downward slop-
ing curve IR after ranking investment projects available to an enterprise on the
basis of efficiency. The point where the two curves intersected is the optimum
enterprise scale when ACs exist.
When investment opportunities expand and IR shifts to the right, the points
of intersection will shift upwards and to the right, capital investment will
expand and λ will rise. On the other hand, when λ + r shifts to the right due to
such conditions as an increase in exogenous variable SI, the points of intersec-
tion with IR will shift downwards to the right, enterprise scale will increase
and marginal AC will decrease. (Actually, in this case, the slope of λ will level
off somewhat due to the fact that < 0, < 0.)∂MACB∂SI
∂MACS
∂SI
Appendix Fig. 6-1. Determination of Enterprise Scale
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Appendix 6-2. Evaluating Policy
Debt-Equity Conversion (DEC)
It is clear that through DEC in appropriate amounts, an optimum capital
structure can be achieved. However, the analysis here indicates that there are
limits to the effectiveness of DEC. Given that both debt- and stock-related
ACs will shift outward due to a currency crisis, as shown in Figure 6-5, even
when merely changing the relative shares occupied by debt and stock, eventu-
ally total ACs will increase more than before the crisis. In order to avoid this
phenomenon, it is necessary to remove the factors causing such shifts in the
marginal AC curve.12
Increased Investment by Controlling Shareholders
The marginal AC curve shifts occurred because SI shrank. (In our model
analysis, the change dSI/SI < 0 resulted in positive signs for dMACB and dMACS.)
Therefore, policies that directly restored SI to its precrisis level were effective.
As an example, investment on the part of controlling shareholders may
increase. However, problems arise as to whether they have the wherewithal to
invest, and if they do, whether they will profit from that investment. If they
have been seriously hurt by a currency crisis, they probably will not have the
wherewithal to invest. Also, as stated in Section I of this chapter, since the
increases in AC accompanying a currency crisis are borne by existing stock-
holders and creditors, which is not the normal case, the benefits of lowering
AC by increased investment on the part of controlling shareholders will not be
reverted to them. Therefore, they have very little incentive to spend their
money.
Debt Relief (Forgiveness) and Rescheduling
When creditors forgive the debts owed to them, stock prices will rise, which
can also restore SI. If debt forgiveness is carried out on the same scale as the
debt amount that swelled as a result of a currency crisis, AC, can be restored to
its precrisis level.
However, the problem is whether such an action will be beneficial enough
to the creditors, because while the stockholders can enjoy reduced AC without
any payment, that part will reduce what is reverted to the creditors. Therefore,
if some means of redistributing income from stockholders to creditors is not
employed, it is unlikely that creditors will be willing to forgive debts of their
own accord.
 In many cases, even if rescheduling does not accompany debt relief, such
actions as putting aside repayment deadlines and reconsidering (lowering)
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interest rates are actually similar to debt relief. Since they reduce the existing
value of debt, that reduction exerts similar effects to explicit debt forgiveness.
Replacing Controlling Shareholders
One more possible step is for new or existing general stockholders to buy
out and take over the enterprise. Obviously, to reduce the marginal AC curve,
the share of new owners must be large enough. However, as in the case of new
investment, the problem is to what extent such action will benefit new owners.
The above measures all necessarily accompany negotiations at the private
level, like debt work out. Therefore, the stickiest problem common to all is the
negotiation costs, which will increase in proportion to the number of con-
cerned parties involved.
The next point to examine is the policies for decreasing AC in general.
Compared to the measures taken in private negotiations, these policies can be
adopted by the government to facilitate monitoring and bonding activities.
Therefore, they have a clear advantage of range, by affecting the whole
economy.
Decreasing Debt-Related Marginal AC
These all include measures that are effective in lowering debt-related mar-
ginal AC by increasing the creditors’ ability to monitor debtors and debtors’
ability to bond: for example, improvement in practices related to debt con-
tracts (promoting desirable financial covenants, improving accounting and
auditing practices), and passing bankruptcy legislation.
The effects of such measures are shown in Appendix Figure 6-2. They aim
at narrowing the gap between debt- and stock-related marginal AC after a
crisis. Although they cannot restore the conditions before the crisis, they can
restore the firm’s subjective optimality condition, i.e., debt-related marginal
AC equated with stock-related MAC marginal AC if the magnitude of the
policy effect is sufficient.
Decreasing Stock-Related Marginal AC
All of these measures attempt to enhance the general stockholders’ ability
to monitor and the firm’s ability to bond: for example, establishing a good
corporate governance system, strengthening the authority of the securities and
exchange commission, and improving the standard of disclosure of securities-
related information. Their effects are shown in Appendix Figure 6–3. They act
in just the opposite manner to debt-related measures by widening the gap
between debt- and stock-related marginal AC, and thus increase the discrep-
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ancy between the present and desirable capital structures according to the
firm’s subjective point of view.
Comparing the Two Measures
While it would appear that debt-related-type measures, which narrow the
gap between the present and desirable capital structures, would be called for,
such is not always the case, because in a post-crisis economy, capital procure-
ment is probably being carried out by stock issuance, in the absence of debt
issuance. That is to say, decreases in debt-related marginal AC ease con-
straints on new capital procurement, unless the magnitude of the effect ex-
ceeds a certain amount. On the other hand, measures to reduce stock-related
MAC exert an immediate effect on reducing the cost of procurement, since the
stock-related MAC binds when firms refer to the fund-raising cost of new
capital.
However, in some cases, debt-related measures are desirable, if their imple-
Appendix Fig. 6-2. Decreasing Debt-Related Marginal AC Narrows
the Gap between the Two Marginal ACs
Measures to reduce
debt-related marginal AC
Adjusting actual
to desirable capital
structure after
the fact 
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MACS (S)
S B
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mentation is easier than that of stock-related measures and if they are ex-
pected to reduce MAC significantly. Also, since large-scale enterprises are
usually the only sector of the industrial structure with access to stock markets,
debt-related measures are the key to policy geared to small and medium-sized
firms. Obviously, since both are by no means mutually exclusive, they can be
applied together.
Appendix Fig. 6-3. Decreasing Stock-Related Marginal AC
Widens the Gap between the Two Marginal ACs
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Notes
The present chapter is a combination of two previously published papers (Kunimune
2000a, 2000b) with revisions added.
1 The framework for analyzing optimum capital from the viewpoint of agency cost
is systematically developed in Jensen and Meckling (1976). This chapter basi-
cally follows that framework.
2 See Modigliani and Miller (1958).
3 In this case, the interests of managers and stockholders are identical.
4 Examples of stockholder monitoring include formal corporate control through
stockholder meetings, incentives to managers via ownership participation such as
stock options, and the appointment of independent directors. Another method of
monitoring is to stipulate what kinds of expenditures will be honored, and ensur-
ing that these limits are honored. Examples of bonding include restricting mana-
gerial discretion by clearly stipulating types of inappropriate behavior and enter-
prises publicly disclosing securities information. Debt-related monitoring includes
the stipulation of financial limits in debt contracts and ensuring that these limits
are honored, while debt-related bonding includes the issuance of financial state-
ments and promise to submit audit reports prepared by certified public accoun-
tants.
5 How to define bankruptcy or failure is in fact very difficult. The most conservative
definition would probably specify the two conditions of excess debt and the
failure to pay it. However, the occurrence of either condition alone could also be
considered to be de facto bankruptcy. Also, even in the case of a capital deficit,
such a condition could be disguised by window-dressing accounting, and in the
case of failure to repay, if creditors decide among themselves to delay payment,
clear-cut bankruptcy can be prevented from occurring.
6 When other conditions remain fixed, increases in debt only will induce a more
opportunistic behavior on the part of debtors, the probability of bankruptcy will
rise, and marginal AC will increase.
7 For example, the problem of debt overhang discussed in Chapter 4.
8 According to Demirguc-Kunt, Detragiache, and Gupta (2000), in the countries
affected by the crisis, the start of economic recovery did not accompany credit
expansion. See also the discussion in Chapter 1 of this book concerning macro
shock.
9 See Mieno (2000).
10 The United States is not only the most lenient in its bankruptcy system but also in
its whole mechanism for enterprise governance. For the topic of bankruptcy, see
Fukao and Morita (1997, pp. 36–37) and Fukao (1999, pp. 132–38).
11 During my own fieldwork in Thailand during 1999, experts there stated that they
were interested in studying Japanese legal institutions in an attempt to reform the
bankruptcy act, but they were faced with language problems and a lack of expert
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help. In the end, they were forced to center their work around American law,
which is far more easily accessible. Much more technical support from Japan is
definitely needed in this area.
12 In addition, in the case of DEC, (1) deciding on conditions and negotiations
becomes difficult and (2) creditors may not be experienced in managing stock
portfolios (thus affecting AC). Both problems can be solved if the stock market is
functioning properly: that is, (1) decisions and negotiations are related to stock
market prices, and (2) stock can be merely sold on the market.
